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The Right to Travel:
In Search of a
Constitutional Source
L INTRODUCTION
The notions embodied in the right to travel, the freedom of
movement and freedom to settle in a place of one's own choosing
without governmental interference, have long been recognized and
protected in the United States. This is particularly true of the right
to travel which was specifically protected by the Articles of Con-
federation;' however, when the Constitution replaced the Articles
of Confederation, it contained no reference to this right of travel.
It is clear that the framers of the Constitution did not intend to
eliminate freedom of travel as a protected right since permitting
states to erect barriers at their borders which would prevent the
free movement of the population is clearly inconsistent with the
theme of national unity which runs through the Constitution.
Consequently, the Supreme Court has generally agreed that
there is a right to travel but there has been no consensus concerning
the constitutional source of this right. At various times, the privi-
leges and immunities clauses, the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, and the commerce clause have all been considered as
potential sources of the right of interstate travel. More recently,
the search for a particular provision in the Constitution as a founda-
tion for the right of travel has been abandoned in favor of the asser-
tion that it exists somewhere in the Constitution.
II. TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES
A. Privileges and Immunities
Of State and National Citizenship
In Corfield v. COr yer, 2 the first court to discuss the right to
1. "The free inhabitants of each of these states . .. shall be entitled to
all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states;
and the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to andfrom any other state... .' (emphasis added). ARTICLES OF CoNED-
ERATioN, Article IV.
2. 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
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travel held that New Jersey could prohibit non-residents from rak-
ing oysters in New Jersey waters because the oyster beds be-
longed to New Jersey. However, the court observed in dictum that
the privileges and immunities of state citizenship clause of Article
IV section 2 of the Constitution would prevent New Jersey from
prohibiting interstate travel itself. The right to travel interstate
was thus considered an incident of state citizenship.
Even at this early date the right to travel was held to include
more than the right to pass through a state. It clearly embraced
the right to move into a state and live there.8
The Corfield theory was followed in a number of early cases.4
It later lost favor with the Court as a source of the right to travel
and fell into disuse. A major shortcoming of looking to Article
IV section 2 for the right to travel is that the clause protects only
against a state's discrimination in favor of its own citizens. 5
After the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the Constitu-
tion guaranteed the privileges and immunities of national citizen-
ship." In the Slaughter House Cases,7 the Supreme Court indi-
cated that the right of interstate travel was a privilege of national
citizenship. Interestingly, the Court cited two earlier cases for sup-
port, Crandall v. Nevada8 and the dissent in the Passenger cases,9
both of which were decided before the ratification of the fourteenth
amendment.
3. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through or to reside
in any other, for purpose of trade, agriculture, professional
pursuits, or otherwise... may be mentioned as some of the
particular privileges and immunities of citizens which are
clearly embraced by the general description of privileges
deemed to be fundamental.
Id. at 552.
4. See United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 298-99 (1920); Ward v.
Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868).
5. The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) contain the
following explanation of the reach of the privileges and immunities
of state citizenship.
Its sole purpose was to declare to the several states, that
whatever those rights, as you granted or established them to
your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose re-
straints on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less,
shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other states
within your jurisdiction.
Id. at 77. See also Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
6. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the priv-
ileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
7. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
8. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
9. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
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Crandall involved a tax Nevada had levied against all people
leaving the state by common carrier. The Court refused to base
its holding that the tax was unconstitutional solely on the com-
merce clause. It went on to find the tax to be an unconstitutional
infringement of the right to travel which was protected as an inci-
dent of national citizenship.' 0
The Slaughter House Court also relied on Chief Justice Taney's
dissent in the Passenger Cases for support of its position that the
fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause protected
the right to travel. Taney had said:
For all the greater purposes for which the Federal Government
was formed we are one people with one common country. We
are all citizens of the United States, and as members of the same
community must have the right to pass and repass through every
part of it without interception as freely as in our own state."
After the Slaughter House Cases, the privileges and immunities
of national citizenship seemed to become a dead letter. The last
significant attempt to put some life into the clause occurred in 1941
in the case of Edwards v. California.'2 California had imposed
severe restrictions on the migration of indigents into the state. The
majority held that the restrictions were an unconstitutional re-
straint of interstate commerce. Justices Douglas and Jackson,
joined by Black and Murphy, refused to follow the majority's lead.
Instead, they reasoned that the right to move from state to state
was associated with national citizenship and was thus protected by
the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.13 Relying on this, however, would mean that aliens would
not be protected in this right.
Since Edwards there has not been a significant attempt to use
the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause as a
source of the right to travel. This factor alone would be enough
to induce one to look elsewhere for a constitutional source. In addi-
tion, relying on the fourteenth amendment implies that between
1789, when the Constitution replaced the Articles of Confederation,
which had guaranteed the right to travel, and 1868, when the four-
teenth amendment was adopted, there was no right to travel.14
10. 73 U.S. at 43.
11. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 492 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
12. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
13. Id. at 178, 182.
14. When the break with England occurred, the Americans considered the
right of travel important enough to be included in the Articles of Con-
federation. See note 1 supra. The Constitution's privileges and im-
munities and commerce clauses incorporated all the provisions of Ar-
ticle IV of the Articles of Confederation except the right of travel pro-
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Such an omission surely was not the intention of the framers of
the Constitution and is also inconsistent with the dicta of Corfield
and the dissent of the Passenger Cases.
B. Commerce Clause
Like the two privileges and immunities clauses, the commerce
clause of Article I section 8 has had its supporters as the constitu-
tional source of the right to travel. In the Passenger Cases,15 the
first right to travel case considered by the Supreme Court, the ma-
jority of the Court seemed to agree that the right to travel was
protected by the commerce clause.
The most famous case utilizing the commerce clause as a source
for the right to travel was Edwards v. California.6 California
had made it a misdemeanor for any person knowingly to bring a
nonresident indigent into the state. The Court held that this was
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.1 7
The commerce clause appears to have some current validity as
a constitutional source of the right to travel, because as recently
as 1966 the Court said it was well settled that "the federal com-
merce power authorizes Congress to legislate for the protection of
individuals from violations of civil rights that impinge on their free
movement in interstate commerce." 18
As with the privileges and immunities clauses, the commerce
clause has its limitations, the most significant being that it acts only
as a restraint against the states. It is an extensive grant to Con-
gress of power to regulate.' 9 Another major objection to relying
on this clause was expressed by Justice Jackson in his concurring
opinion in Edwards.
vision. This omission can be explained in only two ways. Either the
framers left out the right of travel because they saw it as being unde-
sirable, which is unlikely, or they left it out because they considered
the right to be embodied in other provisions of the Constitution.
15. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). The Court overruled a New York law
which required the master of every vessel arriving in New York to
report the name, age, and last legal settlement of every person aboard.
It held that this was not an exercise of the police powers but rather
regulation of interstate commerce. See also United States v. Wheeler,
254 U.S. 281 (1920).
16. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
17. Id. at 174.
18. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). The case involved a con-
spiracy to deprive blacks of their constitutional rights, including the
right to use the highways. The Court did not identify a source of the
right to travel but held that Congress had the power under the com-
merce clause to protect the right of travel.
19. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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[T]he migrations of human beings... do not fit easily into my
notions as to what is commerce. To hold that the measure of his
rights is the Commerce Clause is likely to result either in distort-
ing commercial law or in denaturing human rights.20
C. Due Process Clause
Thus far the due process clause of the fifth amendment has been
utilized as a source of a right to travel only in cases of foreign
travel. In the first of these, Kent v. Dulles,21 the Court found
a right to travel abroad in the due process clause.22
In Kent, although the Court held that regulations adopted by
the Secretary of State denying passports to Communists were in-
valid, it did not rule on the constitutionality of such regulations,
but rather held that the regulations were congressionally unauthor-
ized.
Aptheker v. Secretary of State2a answered the question left
open by Kent. The Court overturned a federal statute which made
it a felony for a Communist to apply for, use or attempt to use
a passport. The statute was held to be unconstitutional on its face
because it was too broad and invaded the right to travel protected
by the due process clause.2
A limitation to the Kent and Aptheker approach to the right
of travel was suggested by Zemel v. Rusk.2 5  In that case, a regula-
tion prohibiting issuance of passports to Cuba was upheld with the
Court saying that even though the right to travel abroad was
protected by due process, it remained subject to reasonable regu-
lation.
As will be shown, such a limitation on the right of interstate
travel would probably be considered void; therefore, due process
may represent too weak a protection for the right to travel 26 since
the right will always be subject to reasonable regulation, if based
on a due process argument.
20. 314 U.S. at 182.
21. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). "The right to travel is a part of 'liberty' of which
the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the
Fifth Amendment." Id. at 125.
22. No person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
23. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
24. Id. at 508.
25. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
26. Zemel also suggested that the right of foreign travel might be more
limited than interstate travel. See Note, The Right to Travel-Quest
for a Constitutional Source, 6 RuTGEas-CAmsx L.J. 122, 129 (1974).
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D. The Current Approach
In the more recent cases, the Court seems to have given up any
notion that the right to travel can be located in any single part
of the Constitution. Instead, it cites the old cases and may add
a sentence indicating that the nature of the federal union requires
a right of interstate travel.2 7  An excellent statement illustrating
this idea is found in United States v. Guest.28
Although the Articles of Confederation provided that 'the people
of each state shall have egress and regress to and from any other
state,' that right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution.
The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so elementry
was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant
of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event,
freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been
recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.... Although
there have been recurring differences in emphasis within the
Court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate
travel, there is no need here to canvass those differences further.
All have agreed that the right exists. 29
III. EQUAL PROTECTION: SEARCHING FOR A TEST
Recently, the right to travel has become entangled with the
equal protection clause. Generally, the cases decided under this
clause have involved a durational residency requirement which was
a prerequisite to engaging in a certain activity or to receiving cer-
tain benefits in a state. Thus, there is a classification based on
an individual's having exercised his right of interstate travel.
Whenever equal protection is in issue, there must be a two-tier
approach to the problem. The first step is to apply the rational
relationship test. Under this test, reasonableness of a classification
determines whether the equal protection clause has been violated,
with the party challenging the classification having the burden of
proving that the classification is unreasonable. In its analysis, the
Court gives great weight to the legislature's determination of what
27. It has been suggested that:[t]he common thread running through all opinions and dis-
cussions on the right to travel is the belief that the right is
inherent in the concept of the Federal Union. While this con-
cept may be implicit in the commerce clause and the priv-
ileges and immunities clauses, no specific clause in the Consti-
tution created the Federal Union.
Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the Constitution, 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 989, 999 (1969). See also Note, Residence Requirements
After Shapiro v. Thompson, 70 CoLum. L. REv. 134, 137-39 (1970).
28. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
29. Id. at 758-59 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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is reasonable. 30 If the classification is based upon a suspect classi-
fication or infringes upon a fundamental right, the strict scrutiny
test, rather than the rational relationship test, is employed. The
classification is considered to be invalid unless the state can show
that this classification is necessary to promote a compelling state
interest.3 1
It is clear that the right of interstate travel is a fundamental
right;32 therefore, it would seem that any durational residency re-
quirement would trigger the strict scrutiny test and that the dura-
tional residency provision would be held to be void. Such, however,
has not been the case. In spite of agreement that the right of inter-
state travel is fundamental, the Supreme Court's approach to the
durational residency requirements and hence to the equal protec-
tion aspect of the right to travel cases has been unclear.
In Shapiro v. Thompson,33 the Court employed the strict scru-
tiny test and held that denying welfare benefits to persons who
had not met a one year state residency requirement was an uncon-
stitutional penalty imposed on individuals who had exercised the
fundamental right of interstate travel.
The Court added a confusing footnote which left the status of
durational residency requirements in other situations in doubt.
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence
requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition
free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt
or fish and so forth. Such requirements may promote compelling
state interests .... [or] may not be penalities upon the exercise
of the constitutional right of interstate travel.34
This statement that some residency restrictions might not be penal-
ties, when read in conjunction with the fact that in this case there
was evidence of a state intention to deter migration, created consid-
erable confusion in the lower courts concerning the extent of the
Court's holding. Some courts held the strict scrutiny test appli-
cable to other residency requirements,35 while other courts applied
30. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
31. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
32. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969).
33. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
34. Id. at 638 n.21. Footnote 21 seemed to make possible classifications
affecting a fundamental right which would be measured by the ra-
tional relationship test.
35. See, e.g., Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970) (pub-
lic housing); Keppel v. Donovan, 326 F. Supp. 15 (D. Minn. 1970),
aff'd, 405 U.S. 1034 (1972) (voting); Kohn v. Davis, 320 F. Supp. 246
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the rational relationship test 6
In 1972, the majority of the Court seemed to bring the correct
test into focus in Dunn v. Blumstein.87 In that case, it held uncon-
stitutional a Tennessee statute which required one year state and
three months' county residency as a prerequisite to voting. Ten-
nessee attempted to distinguish Shapiro by showing that in passing
its statute there was no state intent to deter migration into the
state and that regardless of the state's intent, the residency require-
ment did not act as an effective deterrent to interstate travel. The
Court in stating that Tennessee was mistaken in its argument ex-
plained what Shapiro had meant: "In Shapiro we explicitly stated
that the compelling-state interest test would be triggered by 'any
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right
[to travel] . ' ."'3
Since durational residency requirements would always seem to
be a penalty on exercising the right of interstate travel, it appeared
that after Dunn all such requirements might have to be measured
by the strict scrutiny test and hence be held invalid. The Court
soon dispelled this belief by summarily affirming two district court
decisions which upheld durational residency requirements.3 9
In the latest right of travel case to apply the strict scrutiny test,
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,40 the Court clarified its
(D. Vt. 1970), afi'd mem., 405 U.S. 1034 (1972) (voting); Keenan v.
Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (bar ad-
mission); King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 314 F.
Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971) (public housing).
36. See, e.g., Spatt v. New York, 361 F. Supp. 1048 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd
mem., 414 U.S. 1058 (1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.
Minn. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971); Kirk v. Board of Regents,
273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396
U.S. 554 (1970).
37. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
38. Id. at 340.
39. Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash. 1973) afi'd mem.,
414 U.S. 1057 (1973) (one year durational residency requirement for
receiving in-state tuition rates); Vlandis v. Kline, 414 U.S. 441 (1973)
(the doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions was used to overturn a stat-
ute which denied residence to a student for tuition purposes). See
8 U. RICH. L. REV. 311 (1974); Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257
(D.N.M. 1972), aff'd mem. sub nom., Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020
(1972) (six months' residence before admission to bar). Residency
requirements of more than six months have been held unreasonable.
See Lippman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Webster
v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Keenan v. Board of
Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
40. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
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position on when the strict scrutiny rather than the rational rela-
tionship test would be employed. The case involved an indigent
suffering from respiratory disease who had recently moved into
Arizona. He suffered an attack which required hospitalization.
Under Arizona law, the county government had the duty of provid-
ing necessary hospital and medical care for indigents only if they
had been residents of the county for one year. Since the appellant
had recently arrived from another state, he was ineligible for re-
ceiving medical care from the county.
The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional. The
majority opinion indicated that neither an intent to deter travel
nor actual deterrence was necessary in order to trigger the strict
scrutiny test.41 Under the traditional two-tier approach to equal
protection, the nature of the infringement of a fundamental right
is not considered. It is only necessary to determine if a funda-
mental right is involved. If it is and that right is restricted, the
strict scrutiny test is employed. In Maricopa County, the Court
seemed to have modified the test by holding that the strict scrutiny
test was triggered because medical care was a basic necessity of
life. The Court also stated that this test had been applied in
Shapiro because the residency requirement denied welfare assist-
ance, one of the basic necessities of life, and in Dunn because there
was a denial of the franchise, a fundamental political right.2
Maricopa County can be considered as representing a new
approach in the right of travel cases to the two-tier system of apply-
ing the equal protection test. It appeared that the Court would
not apply the strict scrutiny test until exercising the right to travel
would deprive an individual of a given interest which could be
called a necessity. After Maricopa County the problem seemed to
be one of deciding what interests were so important that depriving
an individual of them would infringe on the right of interstate
travel and trigger the strict scrutiny test.
If Maricopa County seemed to bring order to this confused cor-
ner of equal protection, this was an illusion. Within one year after
it was decided, the Court again modified the test to be employed.
Sosna v. Iowa43 was the first case holding a durational residency
requirement constitutional. In it the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of Iowa's one year durational residency requirement for
obtaining a divorce.
41. Id. at 257-58.
42. Id. at 259.
43. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
126 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 1 (1975)
Sosna represents a marked departure from even the modified
Maricopa County two-tier approach to equal protection. Although
the appellant challenged Iowa's one year residency requirement as
a penalty on the fundamental right to travel, the Court did not
even discuss the issue of whether the residency requirement for
obtaining a divorce was onerous enough to be a "penalty" on the
right to travel and hence trigger the compelling state interest test.
Rather, the Court held that: "Iowa's residency requirement may
reasonably be justified on grounds other than purely budgetary
considerations or administrative convenience. '44
The Court did not mention the deprivation of necessities which,
after Maricopa County, seemed to have been the key to the consti-
tutionality of durational residency requirements.45  Instead, it
stated that the Shapiro line of cases had been decided by using
the balancing test.
What those cases [i.e. Shapiro to Maricopa] had in common was
that the durational residency requirements they struck down were
justified on the basis of budgetary or record-keeping considera-
tions which were held insufficient to outweigh the constitutional
claims of the individuals. 46
Marshall's dissenting opinion stated that the Court was depart-
ing sharply from "the course . ..followed in . ..durational resi-
dency requirements since Shapiro.'47
In its stead, the Court has employed what appears to be an ad
hoc balancing test, under which the state's putative interest in
ensuring that its divorce plaintiff established some roots in Iowa
is said to justify the one-year residency requirement. 45
The seeds of the balancing test enunciated by Sosna were al-
ready present in Shapiro when the Court said: "The constitutional
right to travel from one state to another .. . occupies a position
fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. '49
In order to comply with this position, it is necessary to adopt
a balancing test. But, to do so is not without problems. If
the right to travel is somehow connected with the federalist system,
it is important to remember that the concept of federalism embraces
both limited state autonomy and national unity. 50 If the tradi-
tional equal protection test or the strict scrutiny test were applied,
44. Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 418.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison).
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it could be argued that one or the other of these federalist values
must be sacrificed without proper consideration. For this reason,
if residency requirements which serve to protect the states' interest
in autonomy are upheld, the nation which has an interest in free
movement of the population suffers. If the traditional rational re-
lationship test were applied, the national interest would almost al-
ways be sacrificed to the national interest in free travel. If a strict
scrutiny test were to be employed, the state's interest in autonomy
would almost always be sacrificed to the national and local interests
in the right of travel cases. This tension between the local interest
in autonomy probably explains the Court's dissatisfaction with the
traditional two-tier approach and the resulting confusion in the
cases after Shapiro.
If Sosna does indeed stand for using a balancing test, the com-
merce clause cases provide the best guidance on how the test will
be applied, since commerce is another area in which federalism is
involved and adjustments between the national and the local
interests are required. In regard to the commerce clause the Court
has defined those situations in which the national interest may give
way to the local interest.
When the regulation of matters of local concern is local in char-
acter and effect, and its impact on the national commerce does not
seriously interfere with its operation, and the consequent incen-
tive to deal with them nationally is slight, such regulation has
been generally held to be within state authority.51
If "right of interstate travel" were substituted for "national
commerce," the above test would be applicable to the right of travel
case.
In summary, it appears that the Court has finally found a satis-
factory equal protection test for the right to travel cases. Earlier
attempts to formulate a test were unsatisfactory because they did
not give enough weight to federalist values. Thus, the Court moved
from Dunn which suggested that all durational residency require-
ments were void to Sosna which calls for a balancing of the state
and national interests in making such a determination.
IV. RIGHT OF INTRASTATE TRAVEL?
Examination of statutes placing limitations on intrastate travel
helps to define the limits of the Shapiro line of cases. In United
States v. Wheeler,52 the Supreme Court expressed the opinion in
dicta that there is a fundamental right of intrastate travel.
51. Southern Pac. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (emphasis
added).
52. 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
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In all of the States from the beginning down to the adoption of
the Articles of Confederation the citizens thereof possessed the
fundamental right, inherent in citizens of all free governments,
peacefully to dwell within the limits of their respective States, to
move at will from place therein, and to have free ingress thereto
and egress therefrom.53
If a fundamental right of intrastate travel were to exist, appli-
cation of the strict scrutiny test would probably invalidate many
restrictions on the right to travel. However, if a fundamental right
is not involved, the traditional, easily satisfied, equal protection test
is employed. The Court has subsequently denied the continuing
validity of this dicta. 54
Even if the equal protection clause does not apply, the due
process clause forbids denial of a fundamental right absent a show-
ing of a substantial countervailing state interest.5 5 If the right
of intrastate travel is not fundamental, the due process clause
requires no more than a showing that the legislature or political
subdivision has a reasonable basis for its decision. 56 This is a
much easier test to satisfy and is comparable to the traditional
equal protection standard. Regardle~s of whether the equal pro-
tection or due process test is applied, it is clear that if the right of
intrastate travel is considered to be a fundamental right, the state
will have a very difficult burden in justifying any restriction upon
it.
Although law review articles5 7 and lower court cases 58 have
53. Id. at 293 (emphasis added).
54. 'Whatever continuing validity Wheeler may have as restricted to its
own facts, the dicta . . . have been discredited in subsequent deci-
sions." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 n.16 (1966).
55. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Goodpaster, The Inte-
gration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's
Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REv. 223, 240 (1970);
Note, Due Process Clause-Access to Divorce Courts for Indigents, 46
TuT.. L. REv. 799, 804 (1972).
56. See Section II C supra.
57. Comment, Intrastate Residence Requirements for Welfare and the
Right to Intrastate Travel, 8 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LiB. L. REv. 591
(1973); Comment, Residency Requirements for Municipal Employees,
Denial of a Right to Commute? 7 U. S - FA.NcIsco L. REV. 508
(1973).
58. Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972). A requirement
that policemen and firemen live in the community they serve was held
an unconstitutional restriction on the fundamental right of intrastate
travel. "It would be meaningless to describe the right to travel be-
tween the states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not
to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a
state." Id. at 498. See also King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing
Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971);
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considered the right of intrastate travel to be fundamental, other
courts59 and the Supreme Court itself10 have indicated that there
is no fundamental right of intrastate travel.
In Detroit Police Officers Association v. City of Detroit,61 the
Michigan Supreme Court applied the rational relationship test and
held that an ordinance which required policemen who worked in
Detroit to live in Detroit bore a reasonable relationship to the ob-
ject of the legislation,62 and hence was valid. On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court dismissed the case for want of a sub-
stantial federal questions, 3 even though the appellant's brief
asserted that ". . . the right to live where a citizen chooses is a
fundamental personal liberty that cannot be abridged by a mere
showing that a residency ordinance may be reasonably related to
a proper city purpose."64 The implications of this are that intra-
state travel is not a fundamental right, and that statutes limiting
such travel will be upheld, providing there is a reasonable basis
for the legislature's decision to impose such a limitation.
A. Continuous Residency
In Ector v. City of Torrance, 5 a case involving a librarian who
lost his job because he did not reside in the city where he worked,
Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970) (municipal or-
dinance requiring two years' city residence before admission to public
housing held invalid); Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 111 N.H. 50,
274 A.2d 789 (1971) (ordinance requiring city school teacher to reside
in city held invalid).
59. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190
N.W.2d 97 (1971) appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question, 405 U.S. 950 (1972); Town of Vanden Broek v. Reitz, 53
Wis. 2d 87, 191 N.W.2d 913 (1971) appeal dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question, 406 U.S. 902 (1972); Abrahams v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 319 A.2d 483 (1973) (constitutional to fire
a secretary in a city office who refused to reside within the city);
Town of Milton v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 N.E.2d 188 (Mass. 1974)
(preference given to those who had resided in city for one year when
hiring policemen upheld); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514
P.2d 433, 108 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973) (discussed in text accompanying
note 64 infra); Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.
1975) (continued residency in the city can be required of firemen).
60. See note 61 and accompanying text infra.
61. 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971).
62. The objective of the legislation was to promote good relationships with
the public and provide a readily available reserve of officers in times
of emergencies.
63. 405 U.S. 950 (1972).
64. As quoted in 385 Mich. 519 n.9, 190 N.W.2d 97 n.9 (1971).
65. 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 108 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973).
130 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 1 (1975)
as required by the city charter, the California Supreme Court used
the rational basis test and found the charter provision to be
constitutional.6 6 The court reasoned that the Shapiro line of cases
did not apply because they were concerned only with durational
residency requirements. In none of those cases had there ever been
any debate on the issue of whether states could impose bona fide
residency requirements before conferring certain benefits. The
cases implied that it was permissible to deny medical aid, the right
to vote, or welfare payments to nonresidents. The error the states
had made was in denying these benefits to individuals who had
recently become residents of these states.
Attaching the condition of continuous residence in a city to
employment by that city can be viewed as a condition of bona fide
residency. If, as implied by the Shapiro line of cases, a state does
not violate the fundamental right of interstate travel when it denies
welfare benefits, the right to vote, or emergency medical care to
those who leave the state and are no longer residents of the state,
it could not be successfully contended that a city violates the equal
protection clause when it denies employment by the city to an in-
dividual who is not a resident of the city.
Thus, it would seem that even if there were a fundamental right
of intrastate travel, that right would probably not be violated by
a continuous residency requirement. Since there seems to be no
support for the proposition that there is such a fundamental right,
there is very little possibility of a successful constitutional attack
on a continuous residency requirement.
B. Local Durational Residence
In addition to continuous residency requirements, local dura-
tional residency requirements are also likely to be contested. These
arise when the local unit of government has as a pre-condition to
voting, candidacy for public offices, or receiving welfare, public
housing, or employment that the individual have lived in the locale
for a specified period of time. Even the individual who had lived all
of his life in the state could fail to meet this type of residency re-
quirement because he had not lived in the local unit of government
for the requisite time. Since there is little reason to believe that
intrastate travel is a fundamental right, almost all local durational
residency requirements would survive the low level constitutional
attack to which they would be subjected. However, if the local
durational residency requirement is applied to the new arrival from
outside of the state, the right of interstate travel has been re-
66. The residency provision was overturned on other grounds.
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stricted and the more stringent balancing of interests test, enun-
ciated in Sosna, would be triggered. The Supreme Court in
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,67 indicated that this was
clearly the case. The Arizona requirement that an indigent be a
resident of the county for one year before he was eligible for local
medical assistance discriminated against newcomers to the state, as
well as long-time residents who had not resided in a particular
county for one year. The state attempted to justify the residency
requirement as being only a burden on intrastate rather than inter-
state travel. The Court did not accept the argument and held that
the residency requirement was a penalty on the right of interstate
travel because the new arrival was denied the benefit because he
had exercised the fundamental right of interstate travel.
The Court noted that arguing that the statute applied only to
long-time state residents but not new arrivals might be inconsistent.
It did not say that such an approach would be unconstitutional.
Apparently, a local residency requirement would be measured
by two different constitutional yardsticks depending upon the
status of the challenger. If he were a recent arrival in the state,
the right of interstate travel would be involved and the "stricter"
Sosna test would be applied, with a good chance that the residency
requirement would be invalid as applied to him. If the challenger
were a long-time state resident, no fundamental right would be in-
volved, the low level rational basis test would be employed, and
the local durational residency requirement would almost certainly
be upheld.
This difference in treatment between the long-time resident and
the recent arrival is not inconsistent. The statute as applied to
these two individuals is seeking to do two different things. In the
case of the individual who is traveling interstate and exercising a
fundamental right, the statute, if enforced would enfringe on the
spirit of national unity. However, in the case of the long-time resi-
dent, the state has the right to enact reasonable legislation and en-
force it, thereby preserving state autonomy.
Some local durational residency requirements, even as applied
to long-time residents, may have to be measured by the strict scru-
tiny test 69 if they operate to deprive an individual of some funda-
67. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
68. Id. at 256 n.9.
69. In Dunn v. Blumstein, the Court indicated that there were two inde-
pendent reasons for applying the strict scrutiny test.
In the present case, whether we look to the benefit withheld
by the classification (the opportunity to vote) or the basis for
the classification (recent interstate travel) we conclude that
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mental right, such as voting. In this case, the durational residency
requirement would be tested under strict scrutiny not because it
infringed upon a fundamental right of intrastate travel, but because
some other fundamental right would be involved.70
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is in agreement that there is a fundamental
right of interstate travel. The Court is not sure what part of the
Constitution embodies that right. The later cases suggest that the
Court has given up the search and that the right of interstate travel
is associated with the nature of the federal system.
In its latest right of interstate travel cases, the Court has moved
away from the traditional two-tier equal protection analysis of stat-
utes affecting the right to travel and adopted a balancing test which
permits the competing federal values of limited local autonomy and
national unity to be more finely adjusted.
There is very little support for the notion of a fundamental right
of intrastate travel. Thus, most local residency requirements will
be measured by the low level constitutional test and will probably
be held to be valid.
Duane W. Schroeder '75
the State must show a substantial and compelling reason for
imposing durational residence requirements.
405 U.S. at 335.
70. Since the right to travel is not involved in this situation, discussion
of it is best left to others. See Note, Durational Residency Require-
ments for Candidates for State and Local Offices VioZate Equal Protec-
tion, 22 KAx. L. REv. 116, 116-19 (1973).
